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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20001145-CA

vs.
SANTIAGO A. ACOSTA-TORRES,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of child abuse, a second degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 2000), in the Third Judicial
District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Has defendant preserved his claim that the district court erred by
considering his deportation status at sentencing? If not, has he established "plain

I

error" or "exceptional circumstances"? Alternatively, is the claimed error sufficient
to warrant review as an illegal sentence?
If defendant has not preserved his appeal, his claim is not properly before this
court and no standard of review applies unless he can demonstrate some exception
to the preservation requirement, i.e., "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances"
that may result in manifest injustice. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10
P.3d 346. To establish plain error, defendant must show that the error occurred and
that it was obvious and harmful. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App.
1997). To establish "manifest injustice," defendant must show, at a minimum, a
"truly exceptional situation[]" involving "rare procedural anomalies." State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8, 11 (Utah App. 1996); see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 12.
Whether an appellate court may review the legality of a sentence under rule
22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., involves the interpretation of a rule, a legal determination.
See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995).
2. Did the district court consider defendant's status as an illegal alien when it
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term rather than imposing a jail term
followed by probation? If so, did the trial court violate the Supremacy Clause, due
process, or equal protection?
Review of a trial court's sentencing decision is for abuse of discretion. See
State v Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). The trial court's decision
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will be upheld unless "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the
trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). "So long as basic
constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural fairness are afforded, the
trial court has broad discretion in considering any and all information that
reasonably may bear on the proper sentence." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389
(Utah App. 1997). Whether the trial court has acted consistently with constitutional
safeguards is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. See State v. Arviso,
1999 UT App 381, ^ 5 n.4, 993 P.2d 894.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
included in Addendum A:
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)
U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of child abuse. R. 4-5.
Defendant pled guilty, and the State dismissed an unrelated forgery count. R. 80,
87. The district court judge sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years. R. 107-108. Defendant timely
appealed. R. 111.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
No trial was held. This statement of the facts therefore reflects the crime and
defendant's background as detailed in the "Official Version of the Offense" in the
PSI. &>ePSIat2-4.
The Crime
The victim in this case was a three-month-old baby boy. On June 28, 2000,
the baby's mother left him alone with defendant while she went to the store. When
she returned, the baby had several round bruises on his face. Some of the bruises
had trails where the baby had been slapped and the fingers had left marks. The
baby's left ear was very swollen and bruised. The baby had a partial palm print
above the ear and bruising over his eyes. He also had finger-shaped bruises on his
left hip on his back above his diaper. The mother, defendant, and two friends took
the baby to the hospital. Hospital personnel contacted police officers who came to
the hospital, took pictures, and interviewed the four adults. Id.
After receiving his Miranda warnings, defendant first said that the baby was
sleeping in his car seat with a toy and that the toy must have injured him. When
interviewed a second time, he said that he had accidentally dropped the baby, but
did not strike him. The police officers then showed defendant the pictures of the
baby and pointed to what appeared to be finger and hand marks on the side of the
baby's head. Defendant then stated that the baby would not stop crying after he had
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been dropped and so defendant "flicked" him several times on the side of his head.
Id.
A week later two different police officers interviewed defendant. At that time
defendant stated that the baby was a "brat" and admitted that he did not drop the
baby. Id,
The baby apparently did not suffer any long term or permanent disability as a
result. See PSI at 5.
Defendant's Background
Defendant, a nineteen-year-old Mexican national, came to the United States in
1993 at the age of twelve. Id, at 11. His Utah State juvenile court records reveal
thirty referrals with six status convictions between 1996 and 1999. Id, at 15. He
was placed on probation as a juvenile for burglary in 1996, but transferred for
noncompliance to Youth Corrections later that year. Id, He was released from
Youth Corrections supervision in March 1999. Id,
Defendant turned eighteen in April 1999, eighteen months prior to the current
offense. During that eighteen-month period, he was convicted on one assault count.
Id. at 10. He was also charged with forgery, the charge dismissed in connection
with his plea in this case. Id, The PSI investigator also noted that defendant was
"less than cooperative throughout the investigative process." Id, at 16.
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The PSI investigator noted that the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) intended to implement deportation proceedings after sentencing. Id. She
observed that the agency was concerned about defendant's previous assault charge
and his failure to cooperate. She stated that "defendant would have been an
appropriate candidate for probation after a lengthy period of jail," but observed that
INS deportation plans limited the options available to Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P). Id. She therefore recommended that defendant be sentenced to the
indeterminate prison term prescribed by law and, upon parole, be placed in INS
custody for deportation. Id. at 17.
The Sentencing Hearing
The district court judge, after hearing from defendant, the prosecutor, and
defense counsel and after viewing the photographs of the injured baby, sentenced
defendant to the indeterminate prison term. R. 167:7. The judge stated, "I am not
of the view that the recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate. Indeed, anyone
that would beat up on a child of this nature, in my estimation, really needs some
serious thinking time." Id. The judge further reasoned, "I am concerned that you
might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and endanger some other innocent
victim out in society." Id. He did not mention defendant's status as an illegal alien
or INS deportation plans. See id.

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Defendant has not preserved his claim that the district court erred by
considering his deportation status at sentencing. While defendant stated that he was
"bothered" by the portions of the PSI linking AP&P's prison recommendation to
INS deportation plans, he did not object to the district court's sentence or clearly
and specifically state any ground for objection. Defendant did not mention the
Supremacy Clause, due process, or equal protection, let alone specify them as
grounds for objection. Further, defendant has not demonstrated "plain error" or
"exceptional circumstances" to justify review in the absence of preservation.
Finally, because the claimed error does not render the sentence illegal, defendant
cannot obtain review under rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P.
2. Defendant's claim also fails on the merits. First, defendant has not
demonstrated that the district court judge considered defendant's illegal status or
INS deportation plans when he imposed sentence. Second, even if he did,
consideration of those factors does not violate the Supremacy Clause, due process,
or equal protection.

7

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM AND HAS NOT
SHOWN "PLAIN ERROR" OR "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES";
MOREOVER, HE CANNOT OBTAIN REVIEW UNDER RULE 22(e)
BECAUSE HIS SENTENCE IS NOT ILLEGAL
A.

Defendant has not preserved this issue and has demonstrated no exception
to the preservation requirement.
Defendant argues that the district court based defendant's sentence, in part, on

his status as an illegal alien subject to deportation, in violation of the Supremacy
Clause, due process, and equal protection. Br. Aplt. at 7-20.
Defendant did not preserve these grounds for objection. "'Trial counsel must
state clearly and specifically all grounds for objection.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d
539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12
(Utah 1993)). Indeed, "[t]he objection must "'be specific enough to give the trial
court notice of the very error' of which counsel complains.'" Bryant, 965 P.2d at
546 (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App.
1996) (citation omitted)).
Defendant's only reference to this issue below was a comment by defense
counsel at sentencing. Noting that the PSI investigator had recommended prison,
defense counsel stated that he was "bother[ed]" by statements in the PSI about INS
deportation plans and defendant's candidacy for probation. R. 167:3-4. Defendant
did not, however, object to the inclusion of the material in the PSI or argue that the
8

district court's consideration of the information was improper, let alone
unconstitutional. He did not refer to the Supremacy Clause, to due process, or to
equal protection. Defendant's statement that he was bothered by the evaluative
summary was insufficient to give the court notice of the errors he now claims are
preserved for review.
Defendant also argues in a footnote that he is entitled to review, even absent
preservation, on the basis of "plain error" and "exceptional circumstances." Br.
Aplt. at 20 n.2. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (i) an error
occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error was harmful. See State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Error is not obvious "where there is no
settled appellate law to guide the trial court." See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239
(UtahApp. 1997).
No appellate case law forbids consideration of a defendant's illegal
immigration status or his pending deportation. Cases cited by defendant, State v.
Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, and State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), are
inapposite.
In Arviso, this Court held that a trial court erred when it suspended a prison
term on the condition that the defendant not reenter this country. Id. This action
interfered with the exclusive federal power over admission and exclusion of aliens.
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Id. atfflf6-7. It did not forbid consideration of the ways in which the federal
exercise of that power might affect a sentence.
Johnson merely held that sentencing may not be based on unreliable evidence.
856 P.2d at 1071. The unreliable evidence in Johnson was a report, consisting of
triple hearsay, summarizing the statements of a four-year-old child. 856 P.2d at
1070-71.
Nothing in either case suggested that illegal alienage or imminent deportation
was an improper or unreliable sentencing consideration. Defendant has not
demonstrated that error, if any, was obvious, and thus has not met the plain error
standard.
Defendant also argues "exceptional circumstances." Defendant cites State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted), holding that "unique
procedural circumstances . . . permit consideration of the merits of [certain] issues
on appeal" even though they were not raised below. Defendant argues that, absent
appellate review, manifest justice would occur here because "defense counsel
alerted the trial judge to a concern with imposing a harsher sentence based on
deportation status." Br. Aplt. at 21 n.2. Defendant effectively argues, contrary to
precedent, that specific grounds for an objection are unnecessary where defendant
notifies the court that something is troublesome or that it "bothers" him.

10

Moreover, defendant does not detail any "unique procedural circumstance"
militating in favor of review of this unpreserved issue.
Thus, the issue was not preserved. Neither has defendant demonstrated an
exception to the preservation requirement. This claim is therefore not properly
before this court. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 11 ("preservation rule applies to
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate
that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred").
B.

The sentence imposed was not illegal.
Defendant argues alternatively that "even if the claims were not preserved, this

Court can correct the illegal sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)." Br.
I
Aplt. at 20. Defendant cites State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859-860 (Utah 1995),
as authority that "an appellate court can vacate an illegal sentence even if the claim
is raised for the first time on appeal." Br. Aplt. at 20.
Brooks does permit vacation of an illegal sentence on appeal. Defendant cites
no authority, however, in support of his implicit argument that the sentence imposed
in this case is an illegal sentence.
Rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."1 The rule

!

Rule 22(e) was enacted as statute in 1980 and codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-35-22(e). See 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1. As with other statutory rules of procedure
and evidence contained in the code, rule 22(e) was repealed as statute and adopted as a
(continued...)
11

codified precedent established by Utah courts permitting review of sentences so
"obviously illegal" that "it would . . . be unconscionable not to examine the issue."
See Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1977). These included sentences
imposed by a court having no jurisdiction, sentences not authorized by law, and
sentences "of an entirely different character than that which the statute prescribes."
Id.
Since 1980, Utah courts have held or reasoned that illegal sentences may occur
in the following circumstances:
•

The sentence provides a punishment that does not conform to the statutes
governing the crime of conviction. See State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d
545, 551 (Utah 1996) (statute "d[id] not authorize a consecutive,
determinate two-year [enhancement] term"); State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86
(Utah 1991), 86-88 (sentence to indeterminate term was illegal and void
where statute mandated minimum mandatory sentence; corrected sentence
was lawful, even though harsher); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 138990 (1988) (sentence to indeterminate term with recommended maximum
was illegal where statute requires a minimum mandatory term); State v.
Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, ffl| 6, 14, 14 P.3d 129 (under statute in effect

^...continued)
court rule in 1990. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35 (repealed) (1999 Replacement Part);
Compiler's Notes, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (2001).
12

at the time of sentencing, trial court should have sentenced for
misdemeanors, not felonies); State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 653-654
(Utah App. 1997) (statute did not authorize trial court order that
defendant's property be sold to satisfy restitution); State v. Montoya, 929
P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1996) (statute "d[id] not empower the trial
court to impose a determinate sentence exceeding one year"); State v.
Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1994) (one-year jail sentence
was illegal where statute mandated indeterminate one to fifteen year
term).
The sentence is ambiguous. See Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998, 999 (Utah
App. 1992) (judge's oral pronouncement referred to "aggravated burglary,
a third degree felony," where statute treated aggravated burglary as a first
degree felony).
•

The trial court lacks jurisdiction. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161,
1168 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation
where defendant was not charged with probation violation within his
original probation term).

Utah courts have also held or reasoned that alleged errors do not constitute
illegal sentences in the following circumstances:
•

The defendant challenges the conviction, not the sentence. See State v.
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (merger claim was challenge
13

to conviction, not to sentence; review under rule 22(e) was error); State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858, 860 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address
defendant's argument that 'his convictions for robbery and burglary
illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime," appellate court stated
that it could not "review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when
the substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself,
but to the underlying conviction"); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473
(Utah App. 1991) (argument that defendant was convicted for conduct
prohibited both by arson and aggravated arson statutes was not a
challenge to the imposition of an incorrect and therefore void sentence
and could not be raised for the first time on appeal); see also State v.
Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 1994) (argument that mens rea for
second degree murder and manslaughter did not differ and that defendant
should have been sentenced to the lesser manslaughter penalty was not a
challenge to an illegal sentence that could be corrected at any time under
rule 22(e)).
The trial court bases its sentencing on inappropriate factors. State v.
Wareham, 801 P.2d 918, 919-920 & n.2 (Utah 1990) (defendant asserted
that sentencing enhancement was based on aggravating factors committed
prior to the date of the enhancement statute and therefore in violation of
ex post facto protections; court held that this issue should have been
14

raised on appeal and that it did not constitute an illegal sentence under
rule 22(e)).2
Defendant's claimed error does not constitute an illegal sentence under Utah
law. His sentence is not similar to those Utah courts have declared illegal. The
trial court did not impose a statutorily unauthorized sentence. The sentence was not
ambiguous. Jurisdiction was not lacking.
Although the illegal sentence issue arose in a different procedural context,
defendant's case most closely resembles Wareham, 801 P.2d at 918. Wareham filed
a motion to reduce his sentence following an unsuccessful first appeal. Id. at 919.
Although observing that an illegal sentence could be challenged at anytime, the
Wareham court refused to address defendant's claim, holding that it should have
been brought on appeal, i.e., on Wareham's first appeal. Id. at 919 n.3, 920. Like
defendant in the instant case, Wareham alleged that the trial court based its
sentencing on an inappropriate factor. Id. at 919-920. Like defendant, Wareham
alleged a constitutional violation. Id.
Here, while defendant raises this issue as part of his first appeal, he attempts to
circumvent the normal appellate process by alleging that his sentence is illegal.
While the procedural posture differs, Wareham's analysis is controlling here. An

2

But cf. State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 6 n.l, 975 P.2d 476 (stating in dicta
that ex post facto claim based on resentencing after completion of original sentence and
voluntary withdrawal of plea would be proper under rule 22(e)).
15

allegation that a sentence is based on an inappropriate, even unconstitutional, factor
does not render the sentence illegal.
Further, as a matter of policy, this court should not treat defendant's alleged
error as an illegal sentence. In determining what kinds of errors constitute illegal
sentences, courts must attempt to "balance the need for the finality of convictions
and sentences with the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve
sentences imposed contrary to the requirements of law." Carter v. State, 786 So.2d
1173, 1176 (Fla. 2001); see also State v. Murray, 744 A.2d 131, 134 (N.J. 2000).3
Several consequences attach to the classification of a sentencing error as an
illegal sentence. First, an illegal sentence is reviewable at any time, a characteristic
affecting the finality of judgments. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Further, because

3

Florida and New Jersey courts have systematically addressed the definition of
illegal sentences. Florida courts have defined an "illegal sentence" as a sentence that
"imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes
could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances." Carter, 786 So.2d at 1181.
Examples include sentences that exceed the maximum statutory period for a particular
offense or that fail to credit a defendant with jail time served. Id. A sentence is not
illegal simply because it encompasses a "patent sentencing error[]." Id.
In New Jersey, a sentence "in excess of or otherwise not in accordance" with
statutory mandates is illegal. Murray, 744 A.2d at 134. A sentence may also be illegal
where "it was not imposed in accordance with law." Id. at 135. A sentence may fail, for
instance, to satisfy required statutory presentencing conditions and, as a result, its
imposition would not be in accordance with law. Id. In New Jersey, where statute
prohibits the confinement of a defendant in a youth correctional facility after he has
served a prison sentence, sentencing to a youth facility can constitute a sentence "not
imposed in accordance with law." Id. Likewise, where statutory law mandates a term of
parole ineligibility, a sentence that fails to include that term is "not imposed in accordance
with law." Id.

16

an illegal sentence is a void sentence, a new sentence imposed after vacation of an
illegal sentence is not restricted by the terms of the illegal sentence and may be
harsher. See Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. Indeed, the State (not just the defendant) may
seek vacation of an illegal sentence. The State may claim, for instance, that the the
punishment imposed is less severe than the punishment statutorily mandated. See
id. at 86. In light of these factors, courts have carefully restricted the kinds of
sentencing errors that may render a sentence illegal.
Under Utah law, a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a "sentence that does not
conform to the crime of which the defendant has been convicted" or a sentence
"imposed in an illegal manner." State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994).
It is a "patently" or "facially illegal" sentence. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860
("patently illegal"); Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654 ("patently illegal"); see also
Edwards v. State, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (Nev. 1996) ("facially illegal");
Commonwealth v. Harrison, 661 A.2d 6, 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("patently
illegal"). In other words, the sentence's illegality will usually be apparent upon
review of the relevant statutes, the conviction, and the sentence itself—without
recourse to other portions of the record—because the terms and conditions of the
punishment for that offense are impermissible as a matter of law.
In the instant case, defendant alleges that the trial court considered an
impermissible factor in rendering its decision. Defendant did not object to the
error, thereby preserving his claim for appellate review. He now asks this Court to
17

review the alleged sentencing error as an illegal sentence. Should he prevail and
should this Court determine that the district court inappropriately considered
defendant's deportation status, that decision would open the door to multitudinous
claims of such error, raisable "at any time." Further, it would open the door to
claims by the State that trial courts have erred in imposing sentences that are too
lenient because they inappropriately considered (or failed to consider) some factor.
These issues are appropriate for appeal, not for correction under rule 22(e).
Alleged errors of this kind are not patently in violation of statute. They are not the
kinds of errors that have traditionally merited review as possibly illegal sentences.
This Court should decline defendant's invitation to review the alleged error in this
case under rule 22(e).
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO THE
STATUTORY INDETERMINATE PRISON TERM
Should this Court determine that review is proper, defendant's claim
nonetheless fails on the merits. The record does not demonstrate that the district
court based its sentencing on defendant's status as an illegal alien. In any event,
consideration of defendant's status as an illegal alien subject to deportation does not
violate the Supremacy Clause, due process, or equal protection.
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A.

The record does not demonstrate that the district court based its
sentencing decision on defendant's status as an illegal alien.
Defendant argues that the district court "abused [its] discretion by sentencing

appellant to prison based in part on his immigration status," i.e., "on the fact that
[the] INS planned to deport [him]." Br. Aplt. at 7. The record does not support
this assertion.
The PSI investigator recommended that defendant be sentenced to prison. PSI
at 17. That recommendation was, in fact, based in part on defendant's immigration
status. The investigator was concerned about defendant's assault offense and his
lack of cooperation during preparation of the PSI. Id. at 16. She noted that
defendant desired counseling for anger management and, under other circumstances,
would have been "an appropriate candidate for probation after a lengthy period of
jail." Id. She observed, however, that AP&P's options were "limited" by the INS
plans to deport defendant. Id. Apparently, once released from jail, deportation
proceedings would begin, precluding a supervised probation that might include
anger management counseling.
Nothing in the record suggests that the district court judge adopted the PSI
investigator's reasoning. At sentencing, the judge gave defendant, defense counsel,
and the prosecutor the opportunity to speak. R. 167:3-7. The judge also received
photographs of the injured baby, victim impact statements from the baby's mother
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and grandmother, and the PSI. Id. at 3-5. Based on the evidence before him, the
judge sentenced defendant to prison. Id. at 7.
The judge's only reference to the PSI was this: "Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not
of the view that the recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate." Id. at 7. The
judge's statement reflects only that, like AP&P, he felt that the prison term was
appropriate. It does not indicate that the judge found the sentence appropriate
because of the INS deportation plans.
Rather, the trial judge's explanatory comments show that he considered the
offense sufficiently severe to merit prison and that he imposed a prison term for that
very reason. He said, "Indeed, anyone that would beat up on a child of this nature,
in my estimation, really needs some serious thinking time, and I am concerned that
you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and endanger some other
innocent victim out of society." Id. He then concluded, "I am therefore of the
view, Mr. Acosta-Torres, that you ought to be committed to the Utah State Prison,
and I'll order that to be accomplished forthwith." Id. at 8.

The judge expressed

no other reason for imposing a prison term. Defendant has not demonstrated, and it
would be inappropriate to presume, that the sentence was based on defendant's
immigration status. 4

4

Where the record is "silent" on an issue, an appellate court "assume[s] regularity
in the proceedings below." State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983) (record
silent on issue); see also State v. Wuljfenstein, 657 P.2d 389, 293 (Utah 1982) (defendant
did not raise claim below and therefore issue did not appear in the record, making
20

B.

Even if the district court considered defendant's status as an illegal alien
subject to deportation, consideration of that factor did not violate any
constitutional safeguard.
Defendant argues that imposition of the prison term, allegedly based in part on

defendant's status as an illegal alien, violated the Supremacy Clause of the federal
constitution and defendant's rights to both due process and equal protection under
the law. Br. Aplt. at 6-7.5 Defendant misapprehends the reach of the Supremacy
Clause. Defendant has uemonstrated no violation of his due process and equal
protection rights.
1.

Supremacy Clause

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, makes
federal law binding on the states. State action, if incompatible with the legitimate
exercise of federal power, loses its validity, even if taken within a sphere in which
the state might otherwise act. See License Cases, 5 How. 504, 538 (U.S. 1847),
overruled in part on other grounds by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
When determining whether state action violates the Supremacy Clause, a
court's "primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of [the]
particular case, [the state action] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
defendant's assignment or error "a unilateral allegation which the review court ha[d] no
power to determine"), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774
(Utah 1991); State v. Scott, 447 P.2d 908, 910-911 (Utah 1968) (where record is unclear
as to what happened in trial court, appellate court presumes that the proceedings "were
conducted according to law").
5

Defendant places no reliance on the Utah Constitution. See Br. Aplt at 6-7.
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execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Defendant here argues that the district court judge violated the Supremacy
Clause when he factored INS plans to deport defendant into his sentencing decision.
Br. Aplt. at 8-9. Assuming for purposes of this argument that the judge did
consider the INS plans, defendant has not demonstrated that doing so "constituted
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of any Congressional purpose or
objective. Nor can he.
Defendant argues, citing Arviso, 1999 UT App 38, at f 7, that "[b]asing a
sentence in a state case on a belief that the INS plans to deport the individual
improperly steps into the federal immigration arena, thereby violating the
Supremacy Clause." Br. Aplt. at 9. In Arviso, the trial court suspended a
defendant's prison terms on the condition that the defendant not return to the United
States. The defendant was later deported, but returned to Utah after a short time.
The trial court consequently lifted the sentence suspension and reimposed the prison
term. Because the conditional sentence interfered with the Congressional objective
to assign "the sole power to exclude aliens" to the United States Attorney General,
this Court concluded that the trial court had "trespassed into forbidden INS
territory, violating the Supremacy Clause." Id. at f^f 6-7.
The instant case is easily distinguishable. Here, the district court did not
impose any order excluding or admitting an alien. The court did nothing to
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interfere with Congressional mandates on immigration. If the district court
considered the INS plans to deport defendant, it did merely that—it looked at the
probable federal action with respect to defendant and imposed a sentence
appropriate to accomplish state objectives in light of that federal action.
The sentence imposed did not "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" merely because it
considered the probable federal treatment of defendant. Imposition of a prison
sentence or even the jail sentence defendant favors could interfere with INS action
only if the confinement of any person subject to deportation constituted a violation
of the Supremacy Clause. Defendant does not make that argument or point to any
case law or INS policy suggesting that the confinement of alien convicts interferes
with INS power to institute deportation proceedings and/or to deport.
2.

Due Process

Defendant argues that a sentence based on any consideration of defendant's
status as an illegal alien violates due process. Br. Aplt. at 10-15. Defendant
misapprehends the law, and his cited cases are inapposite.
Defendant cites several cases holding that a sentencing decision based on
nationality, ethnicity, or alien status violates due process guarantees. See United
States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Onwuemene,
933 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349,
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1352 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986).
The State does not argue that a sentence based on those factors is permissible.
The question is rather whether a sentencing court may consider a defendant's
illegal entry and/or his being subject to imminent deportation proceedings. Three of
defendant's cited cases, Leung, Onwuemene, and Borrero-Isaza, do not mention
illegal entry or status. In Leung, the trial judge made two remarks suggesting that
the length of the defendant's sentence was based in part on her ethnic origin and
alien status. 40 F.3d at 585. In Onwuemene, the trial judge imposed a sentence at
the high end of the guideline range because the defendant was not a citizen of the
United States. 933 F.2d at 651. In Borrero-Isaza, the trial judge enhanced the
defendant's sentence because he came from Columbia, a drug "source country."
887 F.2d at 1351. Nothing in these opinions, however, suggests that any of the
defendants had entered this country illegally.
Defendant also cites United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir.
1986). See Br. Aplt at 11. Noting that "[a]n illegal alien comes within the scope of
the word 'person' guaranteed due process," the Gomez court nevertheless held that
the sentencing court could properly consider the defendant's illegal alien status.
"[T]he illegal act of an alien [entering this country] is entitled to no more deference
than some other prior illegal act of a citizen also being sentenced for a drug
violation." Gomez, 797 F.2d at 420. A sentencing judge need not "shut his eyes to
the reality of the factual situation before him and pretend that the defendant is not
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State v. Morales-Aguilar, 855 P.2d 646 (Or. App. 1993) (sentencing court may
consider defendant's unwillingness to conform his conduct to legal requirements as
evidenced by defendant's illegal residency).
Defendant has not pointed to case law holding that a sentencing court violates
due process when it considers a defendant's having entered the country illegally or,
as some courts have phrased it, a defendant's status as an illegal alien.6 Further,
abundant precedent supports the contrary position, i.e., that a court may properly
and constitutionally consider those factors in its sentencing determinations.
Defendant has not demonstrated a violation of due process.
3.

Equal Protection

Defendant argues that "sentencing [defendant] to prison based on his status as
an illegal alien violates equal protection because it does not serve a state interest,
substantial or otherwise." Br. Aplt. at 18 (emphasis in original). Assuming again
for purposes of this argument that the district court sentenced defendant to prison
because of INS deportation plans, this action does not violate defendant's equal

6

Defendant points to only one case where the defendants were clearly illegal
immigrants. See Martinez v. State, 961 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1998). The reviewing court stated
that a sentencing decision based, "in part, upon [the defendants'] status as illegal aliens,"
violates their due process rights. Id. at 145. The case is, however, distinguishable. The
Martinez court referred to the trial court's action as considering interchangeably the
defendants' "status as illegal aliens," their "national origin," their "nationality," and their
"foreign nationality." Id. at 145-146. The court never addressed the issue of illegal entry,
and the case turned on a trial court remark about "people [who] come from foreign
countries." Id. at 145.
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shoplifters. For the most part, the classifications the State makes need onl> "bear[]
some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose/' 7 ' In other words, the
classification must relate rationally to the attainment ••; 1 ..dtimate state interest.
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ofTrs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,

, 121 S.Ct. 955, 963-

964 (2001) (rational basis review, "applicable to general social and economic
legislation," requires only "rational relationship between the disparity of treatment
and some legitimate governmental purpose"). Courts review most classifications
deferentially. See id. at 964 (any rational basis suffices; State need not articulate
reasoning; burden on challenging party to negative "any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification").
Classifications based on certain "suspect classes," such as race, alienage, and
national origin, however, must be more carefully drawn: they must be "narrowly
tailored to the achievement of a compelling state interest." See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (articulating standard for
federal racial classifications); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-494
(1989) (articulating standard for race-based action by state and local governments).
The courts strictly scrutinize state action based on these classifications.
Finally, certain "quasi-suspect" classifications require intermediate or
"heightened" scrutiny. These include classifications based on gender and
legitimacy. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 121 S.Ct. 2053, 2059 (2001) (gender);
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (legitimacy). These classifications are
constitutional only if they "further[] a substantial interest of the State." Plyler, 457
U.S. at 217-218. This standard has been applied to one case involving illegal
aliens, Plyler, cited by defendant. Id.; see Br. Aplt. at 15-18. Plyler applied
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Defendant argues that defendant's status as an illegal alien or as an illegal
alien facing deportation is irrelevant to any legitimate state interest. Defendant's
status is, however, relevant to a variety of legitimate interests. The State has a
legitimate interest in punishing lawbreakers, rehabilitating them, deterring others
from criminal behavior, and protecting society. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
660, 671 (1983).
A defendant's status as an illegal alien is rationally related to the imposition or
denial of probation. A defendant facing deportation will, in most cases, be deported
shortly after his release from custody. To sentence a defendant in that posture to a
jail term, to be followed by probation, means that the defendant will serve only the
jail time. Deportation will follow his release from custody, and no meaningful
probation will be possible. The defendant will not be present for supervision and
required counseling. He will not be available for return to custody if he violates
probation conditions. In effect, defendant will simply serve a reduced sentence. A
court deciding between an indeterminate prison term and a briefer jail sentence
followed by probation is, in reality, choosing only between the indeterminate prison
term and the briefer jail sentence.
Because meaningful probation is impossible, defendant's status as an illegal
alien who may or will be deported, is rationally related to the State's legitimate
interests in punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and the protection of society.
The State's interest in deterring criminal activity generally requires imposition of a
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sentence sufficiently severe to discourage others from, committing an offense.
Fill the! , tl le punishment jppiu|iiuk Uu ,i ttilaiii utlense b. ycueialU iniaiitLikul li
State ' •• •- **- M'iv u:- • w nterest in imposing that punishment unless it
determines that its interests are better met through a induced sentence followed b>
probation. Finally, the State has an interest in rehabilitating the crimj'nal who may,
iilhcil illegally loenti i lln

minli

III nil llin >i inlui 1 in i nmiih'hrnilnl ii! III

State's interest in protecting society from criminal activity in general and from
defendant, whose deportation may not effect his permanent removal, specifically.
' I hey are not only legitimate State interests but substantial state interests. See S tate

because Lthe deft 11VJ.CIJ.11J

llivC

d immediate deportation, imposition oi the

presumptive probationary sentence would not accomplish the goals of the [sentence]
2UiuCiine*'); *ee ahu t t^;-u
,v

,\. \ . . _J*. <, ...

i^ -

,i^utdi * r • inon
»'

"[ojb\iou5>l>, a convicted illegal —u» 1~*QIA, 4- v .. dcpuruuuii, Aouid be unable it
comply with any terms and conditions of probation beyond the serving of any
period I'll local in aitieiatiiiii inipo'icJ").
Consideration of defendant's status is rationally related to these interests.
Defendant's equal protection challenges fail under either a rational basis test or an
intermediate scrutiny test.

C.

Should this court vacate defendant's sentence, remand to the sentencing
judge is appropriateDefendant argues that his sentence should be vacated and this case remanded

for resentencing before a different judge. Br. Aplt. at 21. Defendant cites three
cases where a trial judge improperly based a sentence on alienage and the reviewing
court remanded to a different judge—Leung, 40 F.3d at 587, Martinez v. State, 961
P.2d 143, 146 (Nev. 1998); and Kalbali v. State, 636 P.2d 369, 371 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1981). In each of these cases, the trial judge made comments about aliens that
implied prejudice. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 585 ("[w]e have enough home-grown
criminals in the United States without importing them"; "[t]he purpose of my
sentence here is to . . . deter others, particularly others in the Asiatic community");
Martinez, 961 P.2d at 145 ("[tjhere's something that heightens the nature of an
offense when people come from foreign lands to do offenses in another land");
Kalbali, 636 P.2d at 370 (judge "was not going to spend the taxpayer's money of
this State to rehabilitate somebody from Iran"). The reviewing courts therefore
remanded to a different judge to satisfy "the appearance of justice." Leung, 40 F.3d
at 587.
The judge in this case did nothing to suggest that he harbored any
discriminatory animus toward aliens or that his sentence was based on defendant's
foreign nationality. The above cases are inapposite. Remand to the trial judge is
appropriate and in no way inconsistent with "the appearance of justice."
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CONCLUSION
Defendant1 s conviction shouiu i^ ailirmed

Mii-no i;.s sentence ix- wuaicd,

icnum! -.In nil I In I i Ilit1 sniilnn ni|f iinli'i1
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Aa\i\\<\ (MARK I. SHURTLEFF
— * nie\ General
ptfa**u

JEANNE H : \ o l YE
Assistant Attorne\ General

CERTIFICATE OF MAIL
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were either mailed, postage prepaiii. *•. iaiu, aenxered to * a

Suite 3U, Salt *^ake Cii), Li i 4 L i , ;his _J_

itt.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM "A'

R u l e 21 5

I H AH Rl JLES OF CRIMINA I PROCEDI IRE

tioning. State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 999 P.2d
565.
Verdict f o r m s .
There is no statute in this state requiring the
court to prepare forms of verdict. It has, however, been the general practice of trial courts to
do that, and it might be that, when they under-

|,:]2

took to do so, they should have prepared forms
as complete as the case requires. State v
Romeo, 42 Utah 46, 128 P. 530 (1912), overruled on other grounds, State v. Crank, 105
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943).
C i t e d in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah
1993).

. . . . m - i ' A J . REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —- ,;itiAi:i -;«ir \ia Trial $ i".' n)
et seq.
C.J.S. — 23A C .1 S. * Vimmal Law $ 139." ~t
seq.
AX.R. — Inconsistency of criminal verdict as
between two or more defendants tried together,
22A.L.R.3d717.
Juror's reluctant, equivocal, or conditional
assent to verdict, on polling, as ground for

mistrial or new \t\u\ w TiiuiiijI, tvisr y,
A.L.R.3d 1149.
Validity and efficacy of accused's waiver of
unanimous verdict, 97 A.L.R.3d 1253.
Requirement of jury unanimity as to mode of
committing crime under statute setting forth
the various modes by which offense may be
committed, 75 A.L.R.4th 91.

Rule 21.5. Repealed.
R e p e a l s . — Rule 21.5, establishing procedure for pleas claiming mental illness or insan-

ity, was repealed effective January 1, 1996. For
similar provisions, see § 77-1.6a-103.

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds t h a t a defendant may be tried in dt-ienaahi •
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If v,
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest, may h<issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) "When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imp<---"i m villegal manner, at any time
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the umi i ^ i ., IUMsentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Cn<\p If t he court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a
shall so specify in the sentencing order,
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1 , 1995; J a n u a r y 1, 1996.)

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate,

JAMES WILSON,

Gouv MORRIS.

Delaware

GEO: READ,
GUNNING BEDFORD JUN,
JOHN DICKINSON,
RICHARD BASSETT,
JACO: BROOM.

Marvlqnrj

JAMES MCHENRY,
DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER,
DANL CARROLL.

ARTICLE v i

JOHN BLAIR,
JAMES MADISON JR.

[MISCELLANEOUS PR* ">VIS ft :.\>
[ A s s u m p t i o n of p u b l i c d e b t — S u p r e m e Law -- * -.nh of
office — R e l i g i o u s t e s t s prohibited.!
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into,
before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid
against the United States under this Constitution, as under
the Confederation.
[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States.
ARTICLE VII
[ADOPTION1
[Ratification — A t t e s t a t i o n . 1
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between
the States so ratifying the same. Done in Convention by the
unanimous consent of the states present the seventeenth day
of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and eighty seven, and of the independence of the
United States of America the twelfth. In Witness Whereof we
have hereunto subscribed our names,
New Hampshire

JOHN LANGDON,
NICHOLAS OILMAN.

Massachusetts

NATHANIEL GORHAM,
RUFUS KING.

Connecticut

WM. SAML. JOHNSON,
ROGER SHERMAN.

New York

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

New Jersey

WIL: LIVINGSTON,
DAVID BREARLEY,
WM. PATERSON,
JONA: DAYTON.

Pennsylvania

B FRANKLIN,
THOMAS MIFFLIN,
ROBT MORRIS,
GEO. CLYMER,
THOS. FITZSIMONS,
JARED INGERSOLL,
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-.•-•rTh {. 'arolina

WM BLOUNT,
RICHD DOBBS SPAIGHT,
Hu WILLIAMSON.

South Carolina

J. RUTLEDGE,
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY,
CHARLES PINCKNEY,
PIERCE BUTLER

Georgia

WILLIAM FEW,
ABR BALDWIN.

In t

ii-ii Monday September 17th 1787.
Present The States of

Newr Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Ilamilton
from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of
this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People
thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for
their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice
thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as
soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this
Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should
fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States
which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the
Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the
Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors, should be
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected:
That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the
Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes
certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution
requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should
convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators
should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose
of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President;
and. that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with
ih" President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
*: ritution.
~_T ihe Unanimous Order of the Convention.
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary.

A M E N D M E N T S TO T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N O F THE
U N I T E D STATES
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS]
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII

A

1

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

A M E N D M E N T XIII
Section
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
S e c t i o n 1. [ S l a v e r y p r o h i b i t e d . ]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. [ P o w e r to enforce a m e n d m e n t ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
A M E N D M E N T XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the < <>n:Wi
eracy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section

1. ( C i t i z e n s h i p — D u e p r o c e s s of l a w — E q u a l
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2.

[ R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — P o w e r to redu.ce a p p o i n t
ment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
S e c . 3. [ D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n to h o l d office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
S e c . 4.

[ P u b l i c d e b t not to be q u e s t i o n e d — D e b t s of
t h e C o n f e d e r a c y a n d c l a i m s n o t to be p a i d . ]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payiiient of pensions

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but ail such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [ P o w e r to e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article,
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color r.
2, [Power to enforce amendment.]

* :

' -I

*M*iti.**«

w.w,
•
— Kace or o i o r
ifv.i
n-.r r]>::.* t .mzens oi me United States to vote shall not be
lt-nit l *r abridged by the United States or by any State on
;•.count of race color, or previous condition of servitude.

Sec. 2. [ P o w e r to e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation
AMENDMEN'i V",/I
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes oi
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion
ment among the several States, and without regard to an;
census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVII
[Election of senators.]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of tw
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for si
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors i
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electo:
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any Sta
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issi
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That tl
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vaca
cies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect t
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes va
as part of the Constitution.
A M E N D M E N T XVIII
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMEN I
XXI, SECTION 1.]
Section
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.]
3. [Time limit for adoption.]
S e c t i o n 1, [ N a t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n
Tr'oxirating
quors.]
After one year from the ratification of this article
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liqi
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation the
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 15, 2000)

3

THE COURT: State of Utah versus Acosta-Torres,

4

Santiago, case No. CR-002118.

Mr. Buividas -

5

MR. BUIVIDAS: That's correct.

6

THE COURT: —

you are appearing on behalf of this

7

defendant, and Ms. Higgins

8

MS. HIGGINS: Yes.

9

THE COURT: -- for the State?

10

MS. HIGGINS: Yes, your Honor.

11

MR. BUIVTDAS: If I may, your Honor, I have some

12
13
14

—

letters for the Court.
THE COURT: Yes, you may, certainly.

You are Santiago

Acosta-Torres; is that correct?

15

MR. ACOSTA-TORRES: Yes, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Mr. Buividas is here as your lawyer; is

17

that correct?

18

MR. ACOSTA-TORRES: Yes, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: For the record, this is the time set for
The defendant entered a plea of guilty on the 13 th

20

sentencing.

21

of November of this year to the second-degree felony charge

22

of child abuse.

23

received and reviewed.

24

have you not?

25

A presentence report has been ordered now,
Mr. Buividas, you've seen the report

MR. BUIVIDAS: We have, your Honor.

1 I
2
3

THE COURT: Is there any legal

reason known to you why

I should not proceed with sentencing at this time?
MR. BUIVIDAS: I don't have any legal reasons.

I do

4

have a couple concerns about this report, if I may. The last

5

two sentences

6

—

THE COURT: Well, we'll deal with your opportunity to

7

challenge the accuracy of the report in a moment, but you know

8

of no legal reason why we shouldn't impose sentence?

9
10
11
12

MR. BUIVTDAS: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

Okay.

Then before I do so, do you

wish to say anything on behalf of your client?
MR. BUIVTDAS: Yes, your Honor.

!

The last two sentences

i

13

of the evaluator's summary bother me a great deal, if I may

14

disclose that.

It says, "It should be noted ~ *

15

THE COURT: What page are you referring to?

16

MR. BUIVTDAS: It will be page 16 of the defendant's

17
18
19
20

presentence report.
THE COURT: Okay, and the last paragraph, last two
sentences?
MR. BUIVTDAS: Two sentences of that.

"It should

21

be noted the defendant would be considered an appropriate

22

candidate for probation after a lengthy jail period or a

23

period of jail.

24

limited, knowing that INS plans on deporting the defendant,"

25

and then they recommend prison.

However, this agency's options are now

I

-4

1

I'm extremely bothered by it and I attempted to call

2

the person that did this report, Stacy Smith, but she's out of

3

the office until the 18th.

4

recommending a year in jail in this case, and I think that

5

would be an appropriate resolution.

I do know the State's planning on

6

If the Court is strongly leaning towards prison, then

7

I'd ask for some more time to at least talk to the officer and

8

get to the bottom of it.

9

here in that regard.

I think it's not a very good report

10

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Buividas.

11

Mr. Acosta-Torres, before I decide what to do here,

12

Thank you.

do you have anything to say?

13 I

MR. ACOSTA-TORRES: Yes, your Honor, I do.

I promise

14

you today and I would like to tell you that I did wrong, and

15

I'm sorry for what I did and I will take responsibility for

16

what I did.

17

family waiting for me at home, a beautiful daughter and wife,

18

and they need me just as well as I need them, and I mean,

19

physically, morally, mentally, economically.

20

what I did and I will take responsibility, whatever you think

21

is going to help me better myself.

I also want to tell you that I have a beautiful

I'm sorry for

Thank you, your Honor.

22

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Acosta-Torres.

Thank you.

23

Ms. Higgins, what is the State's position, and let me

24

inquire further if we have anyone to speak on behalf of the

25

victims?

1

MS. HIGGINS: Your Honor, the grandmother called me

2

this morning, grandmother of the victim, and said that they

3

wanted to come but they could not because of a death in the

4

family.

5

grandmother filled out victim impact statements.

So they are not here, but both the mother and the

6

THE COURT: Yes, and I've seen those.

7 I

MS. HIGGINS: Your Honor, I have photos of the child,

8

if I may approach.

9 I

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

Well, let's see, I have a

10

victim impact statement from the mother and grandmother, and

11

these are photos here.

12 I
13

MS. HIGGINS: The State is recommending one year and
deportation.

14

THE COURT: All right, Counsel, Ms. Higgins.

15

MR. BUIVIDAS: Let me add, your Honor, you know, he's

16

going to be deported, it looks like.

17

comes back in the country, he's going to prison for the re-

18

entry.

The Court can still throw him in prison if he comes

19

back.

I know a lot of good prisons, and it's going to tie up

20

resources of the State.

21

If that happens, if he

He is trying to make in jail there, make the best use

22

of his time.

If he can get his GED and high school diploma,

23

he's planning on doing.

24

guy can do for himself at this point.

25

motivational classes on a weekly basis to discuss problems

That's probably the best thing the
He is taking some
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with other inmates.

2

it's a 12-step program while he's in there on a regular basis.

3

He's going to an LDS substance abuse

—

You know, he came here as a young child with his

4

family.

I guess it was either in his early teens or just

5

prior to that, you know, and had he taken some stuff a couple

6

of years ago as he should have, he wouldn't be getting deported

7

now, but unfortunately that's because, as the juvenile record

8

reflects, he has a lack of responsibility in a certain regard.

9

The juvenile record there, he seems to think that a

10

couple of the things are duplicates, and that may well be true.

11

With all of the arrests, sometimes they put them on the same.

12

His biggest problem as a juvenile, he ran away from home, so

13

they ended up putting him in a proctor home, and he'd keep

14

coming back to Court on that regard.

15

He has to learn from all this, your Honor.

I don't

16

know what's going to teach him anything more important.

17

family is here.

18

100 percent supportive in trying to help him out and doing what

19

they could to help him.

20

Court, if that's okay.

21
22
23
24
25

He's got a very good family.

His

They've been

His mother would like to address the
No?

THE COURT: No.

Okay.

I'll hear from victims, but I don't

hear from relatives of defendants.
MR. BUIVIDAS: Okay, I kind of thought that might be
the case.
THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. BUIVIDAS: But anyway, we would just ask for a year

2

of jail —

3

for time served that he has done.

4

has taken responsibility.

5 J

or even, you know, if the Court's inclined, credit
He has done 155 days.

He

I know that those pictures are awful and they're very

6

serious.

I think we're grateful, according to the reports

7

here, that there's been no permanent injury or serious injury

8

to the child other than what you see on the pictures there,

9

which is not minimizing one bit, but it appears the baby

—

10

everything is on track for the baby, and he's been extremely

11

sorrowful, and his whole time in jail he has mourned.

12

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Buividas.

There being no

13

legal reason why I should not impose sentence, I will do so at

14

this time, Mr. Acosta-Torres.

15

of this Court that you serve the term provided by law in the

16

Utah State Prison of 1 to 15 years for the second-degree felony

17

charge for which you have pled.

18

pay as restitution any and all counseling and/or medical

19

expenses incurred by this victim or the mother of the victim.

20

It is the judgment and sentence

I will order moreover that you

Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not of the view that the

21

recommendation from APSP is inappropriate.

Indeed, anyone

22

that would beat up on a child of this nature, in my estimation,

23

really needs some serious thinking time, and I am concerned

24

that you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and

25

endanger some other innocent victim out in society.

-8
I'm therefore of the view, Mr. Acosta-Torres, that you
ought to be committed to the Utah State Prison, and I'll order
that that be accomplished forthwith.

I will grant you credit

for the 155 days that you've now served awaiting disposition of
this matter, and you can take while you're there, if you're
able and inclined to do so, anger management training and
classes.

Good luck to you.
(Hearing concluded.)

Thank you, Counsel.

